npm warn Unknown env config "http-proxy". This will stop working in the next major version of npm.

> telegram-task-earning@0.20.0 check
> node scripts/run-quality-checks.js


[phase-20-check] Running lint
npm warn Unknown env config "http-proxy". This will stop working in the next major version of npm.

> telegram-task-earning@0.20.0 lint
> eslint . --max-warnings=0


[phase-20-check] Running format:check
npm warn Unknown env config "http-proxy". This will stop working in the next major version of npm.

> telegram-task-earning@0.20.0 format:check
> prettier . --check

Checking formatting...
All matched files use Prettier code style!

[phase-20-check] Running test
npm warn Unknown env config "http-proxy". This will stop working in the next major version of npm.

> telegram-task-earning@0.20.0 test
> node --test

✔ Admin auth routes are composed behind validation, session, and CSRF gates (78.117395ms)
✔ configured Admin IP policy rejects disallowed networks before authentication (10.46141ms)
✔ Express foundation serves service, liveness, readiness, and safe 404 responses (71.020159ms)
✔ readiness returns 503 without disclosing database errors (21.530777ms)
✔ web bootstrap verifies MySQL, configures HTTP, becomes ready, and shuts down (27.098629ms)
✔ web bootstrap fails closed and releases resources for an unsupported database (2.490999ms)
✔ web bootstrap connects Redis for distributed protection and closes it on shutdown (6.304083ms)
✔ migration dry run validates all files without secrets or a live database (266.462356ms)
✔ seed and rollback dry runs are offline and deterministic (421.580602ms)
✔ unknown database command options fail closed (164.513147ms)
✔ example verification succeeds and redacts sensitive placeholders (174.89036ms)
✔ using the example as a runtime environment fails closed without leaking secrets (141.637214ms)
✔ runtime verification succeeds from deployment environment values (121.68718ms)
✔ wallet and history endpoints require a verified Telegram session (58.510992ms)
✔ wallet API returns string amounts and cursor pagination metadata (20.351523ms)
✔ wallet history rejects excessive limits and unknown query input (17.877621ms)
✔ task APIs require a server-verified Telegram user session (107.754565ms)
✔ task start requires CSRF, an empty body, and an Idempotency-Key (36.066323ms)
✔ claim validates ownership-shaped IDs and returns server reward data (15.184466ms)
✔ Admin task lifecycle routes enforce their exact permission (16.531178ms)
✔ public referral endpoints require a verified Telegram session (63.527251ms)
✔ Admin referral routes enforce distinct view, review, and settings permissions (36.297463ms)
✔ Admin review requires CSRF, review permission, reason, and resource version (14.887425ms)
✔ public Mystery Box endpoints require a verified Telegram session (63.76349ms)
✔ free claim requires CSRF, an empty body, and an Idempotency-Key (53.678951ms)
✔ Admin reads, claims, management, and lifecycle use distinct permissions (35.435306ms)
✔ public method, quote, and withdrawal history endpoints require verified Telegram identity (105.558673ms)
✔ quote and create use strict schemas, CSRF, and a required idempotency key (58.129072ms)
✔ Admin withdrawal reads and decrypted destination details use distinct permissions (19.798694ms)
✔ Admin review checks the submitted decision permission and payout confirmation is separate (15.19432ms)
✔ content endpoints require verified Telegram identity (65.927783ms)
✔ announcement read evidence requires CSRF and an empty strict body (39.361671ms)
✔ Admin banner reading, editing, and publishing use separate permissions (12.217484ms)
✔ Admin settings and feature flags enforce exact permissions and strict versions (14.413405ms)
✔ Notification inbox requires Telegram identity and read mutation requires CSRF (90.009714ms)
✔ Template reads and broadcast approval require their exact Admin permissions (27.682025ms)
✔ Reminder creation validates timezone-shaped schedule inputs before service execution (18.946114ms)
✔ earning history and leaderboard require a Telegram-authenticated user (57.755365ms)
✔ financial analytics require their exact high-sensitivity permission (17.355376ms)
✔ report range and leaderboard pagination are rejected before service execution (11.679069ms)
✔ Mini App shell renders EJS with a narrowly scoped official Telegram SDK CSP (120.191873ms)
✔ Mini App module assets revalidate and private paths remain inaccessible (48.021871ms)
✔ Maintenance allows only the public shell/assets while protected API stays closed (16.693748ms)
✔ Banned sessions can load the shell for an error screen but cannot access API data (9.446046ms)
✔ admin shell and assets are public but contain no account data and deny framing (88.585626ms)
✔ every operational route fails closed without its exact read permission (50.59869ms)
✔ authorized reads validate pagination, return string amounts, and record audit context (15.962656ms)
✔ catalog exposes only allowed screens and hides payment account details from reviewers (8.225801ms)
✔ maintenance preserves shell access and follows configured admin access policy (14.997771ms)
✔ upload size exception requires permission and CSRF and does not enlarge other routes (40.691068ms)
✔ all Phase 19 operations reject anonymous callers even with a valid anonymous CSRF token (120.467443ms)
✔ all Phase 19 operations enforce their exact permissions before invoking the service (51.482578ms)
✔ every authorized operation routes a strict validated body and trusted actor context (46.811315ms)
✔ CSRF, malformed money, stale-body fields and oversized input are rejected without a write (18.219299ms)
✔ public enrollment keeps CSRF protection and strict one-time-token validation (16.183139ms)
✔ Phase 9 user endpoints require a server-attached session (96.778738ms)
✔ profile mutation requires CSRF and rejects unapproved fields (41.414469ms)
✔ admin user inspection requires both admin authentication and users.view (14.209152ms)
✔ maintenance keeps bootstrap, authenticated admins, and configured webhook reachable (11.281259ms)
✔ Telegram auth and webhook routes are composed behind their security gates (92.862855ms)
✔ Admin authentication and RBAC trust only server-attached identity and permissions (1.064555ms)
✔ Admin IP allowlist supports exact addresses and bounded CIDR ranges (3.510623ms)
✔ database schema enforces the current security and money contract (51.453674ms)
✔ unexpected async errors disclose neither stack traces nor embedded Telegram tokens (57.551432ms)
✔ invalid incoming request IDs are replaced with server-generated identifiers (10.992152ms)
✔ security headers allow Telegram framing only through CSP (41.719578ms)
✔ production responses enable HSTS and HTTPS upgrade policy (20.886971ms)
✔ strict CORS rejects unknown origins and handles approved preflights (10.600832ms)
✔ signed double-submit CSRF flow protects unsafe JSON requests (18.49553ms)
✔ body parsing rejects unsupported, malformed, and oversized payloads safely (20.302619ms)
✔ rate limiting emits standard controls and fails closed when its store fails (16.656102ms)
✔ maintenance gates application traffic but preserve liveness (12.322438ms)
✔ readiness fails safely when the distributed security dependency is unavailable (6.231585ms)
✔ Phase 10 migration makes ledger entries append-only and excludes pending balances (3.930556ms)
✔ ledger repository locks account rows in deterministic database order (1.014669ms)
✔ wallet history keeps cursor values parameterized (0.310027ms)
✔ runtime ledger repository contains no entry update or delete operation (2.479959ms)
✔ Phase 11 migration snapshots attempts and blocks duplicate active attempts and claims (12.738656ms)
✔ public task mapping never exposes destination or internal database identifiers (0.644622ms)
✔ Admin task filters keep hostile input parameterized (0.484ms)
✔ task completion uses the existing transaction for ledger settlement (1.77036ms)
✔ task routes declare separate permissions for viewing, editing, publishing, and review (7.103309ms)
✔ Phase 12 migration preserves referral evidence and optimistic state transitions (14.324537ms)
✔ Admin referral search keeps hostile input in query parameters (0.561316ms)
✔ Referral reward settings require string minor units and matching versions (9.402095ms)
✔ Task completion invokes referral activation inside its existing transaction (1.943681ms)
✔ Referral API exposes reads only while Admin mutations require exact permissions (9.055382ms)
✔ Referral activation amount comes only from validated server settings (0.667466ms)
✔ Phase 13 migration enforces single-active, free-only, immutable claim evidence (7.453808ms)
✔ claim flow locks user and reward state before atomic ledger settlement (2.038894ms)
✔ client cannot select the box, reward, amount, ticket, or paid access fields (2.756756ms)
✔ Admin claim search keeps hostile values parameterized (0.466183ms)
✔ repository hardcodes zero cost and no purchase on every box insert (0.295576ms)
✔ route permissions separate claim evidence from lifecycle and configuration (4.297339ms)
✔ Phase 14 migration protects immutable quotes, requests, approvals, history, and payouts (14.18743ms)
✔ withdrawal creation locks user, quote, and method before holding funds and consuming the quote (1.965733ms)
✔ client payloads cannot choose fees, net totals, status, approvals, or payout evidence (8.368356ms)
✔ Admin search values remain parameterized and LIKE metacharacters are escaped (0.493724ms)
✔ destination details use authenticated encryption context and a separate hash (4.463018ms)
✔ manual provider is the only enabled payout implementation and rejects automatic mode (0.673626ms)
✔ route permissions separate reads, sensitive details, decisions, payout, methods, and settings (0.86911ms)
✔ Phase 15 migration versions content and protects lifecycle evidence (7.257192ms)
✔ public banner query requires active time window and verified public media (0.532493ms)
✔ public announcement query binds user reads and server-owned visibility windows (1.052938ms)
✔ public tutorial queries expose published rows only with safe cover media (0.221854ms)
✔ content routes separate management, viewing, and publishing permissions (2.849636ms)
✔ configuration routes enforce exact settings, flag, theme, currency, and maintenance permissions (0.667026ms)
✔ raw Admin text is converted to safe HTML and never passed through as body_html (1.015792ms)
✔ public media serving uses verified metadata, containment, size, and hash controls (1.58518ms)
✔ Phase 16 migration protects immutable template and delivery evidence (10.579771ms)
✔ Outbox claim query uses row locks, leases, bounded attempts, and SKIP LOCKED (1.08719ms)
✔ Message routes separate view, edit, approval, cancellation, and reminder permissions (1.876629ms)
✔ Telegram worker has one allowlisted method and never stores raw provider response (1.382294ms)
✔ Broadcast audience excludes deleted and non-writable Telegram accounts (0.64988ms)
✔ Phase 17 migration protects immutable leaderboard and rollup evidence (11.496253ms)
✔ leaderboard materialization snapshots privacy-safe display data (1.207481ms)
✔ earning history is sourced from posted ledger evidence and uses keyset pagination (3.283591ms)
✔ financial totals and operational reports use distinct permissions (2.597416ms)
✔ Telegram re-sync merges profile data instead of erasing privacy preferences (1.80396ms)
✔ Mini App modules use local resolvable imports and do not persist authentication material (37.545416ms)
✔ Mini App shell permits zoom, has safe-area viewport and loads no inline code (1.195182ms)
✔ Mini App CSS retains mobile clearance, keyboard focus and reduced effects (0.938615ms)
✔ media processor decodes pixels, removes appended data and strips metadata (20.092713ms)
✔ media processor rejects disguised SVG, mismatched MIME, truncated data and excess pixels (15.973923ms)
✔ upload accepts only strict filenames, bounded base64 and explicit supported media types (6.621844ms)
✔ upload writes only generated paths and stores a digest matching the served pixels (9.473954ms)
✔ operational searches bind escaped wildcards and reject unknown query models (0.712484ms)
✔ console projections exclude password, session, payload and raw security evidence columns (0.296397ms)
✔ admin user filters keep hostile search and status values out of SQL text (0.769961ms)
✔ admin user repository parameterizes pagination and search values (0.866376ms)
✔ profile writes update only allowlisted preference columns (0.249196ms)
✔ Telegram webhook requires the exact secret header without reflecting it (1.346921ms)
✔ approved project directories exist (9.923782ms)
✔ package metadata is private, ESM, exact-pinned, and script-complete (2.446358ms)
✔ runtime policy accepts supported LTS lines and rejects unsupported lines (0.355656ms)
✔ web entry point fails closed when deployment configuration is missing (526.056731ms)
✔ repository does not contain a real environment file (4.145815ms)
✔ password success creates only a staged two-factor challenge (1.897351ms)
✔ unknown and incorrect Admin credentials return the same public failure (1.475575ms)
✔ valid TOTP atomically advances replay state and promotes the challenge (0.780857ms)
✔ invalid TOTP revokes its challenge and commits lockout evidence (0.84248ms)
✔ one-time bootstrap creates an active 2FA Super Admin under a database lock (1.872453ms)
✔ bootstrap command refuses missing one-time inputs before opening MySQL (0.567125ms)
✔ native Argon2id hashes verify correctly and reject malformed resource parameters (111.094592ms)
✔ AES-256-GCM encrypts TOTP secrets with admin-bound authenticated context (2.800663ms)
✔ TOTP matches RFC 6238 vectors and blocks accepted-step replay (5.938803ms)
✔ recovery codes are one-time-hashable, bounded, and never store plaintext (1.095081ms)
✔ admin challenge is opaque, hashed at rest, short-lived, and cookie-separated (1.920595ms)
✔ authenticated admin session loads server-side permissions and rolls idle expiry (0.92854ms)
✔ operational error classes expose stable codes and HTTP statuses (1.043093ms)
✔ AppError rejects invalid status codes and unstable error codes (0.404069ms)
✔ unknown errors normalize to a non-exposed internal failure (0.27848ms)
✔ malformed JSON normalizes to a safe client error (0.144427ms)
✔ configuration modules map validated values and preserve bigint-safe database options (8.040402ms)
✔ complete configuration is deeply frozen (1.051155ms)
✔ diagnostic projection does not expose configuration secrets (1.22041ms)
✔ MySQL version policy accepts supported Oracle MySQL and rejects alternatives (1.640453ms)
✔ acquired MySQL connections are initialized with UTC and strict SQL mode (0.286943ms)
✔ query helpers keep values parameterized and identifiers allowlisted (0.790592ms)
✔ pagination helpers clamp limits and calculate stable metadata (0.270047ms)
✔ transaction helper commits success and rolls back failure (0.515027ms)
✔ transaction helper retries only deadlock-class errors (0.866066ms)
✔ example template contains every declared key and validates in template mode (26.099199ms)
✔ valid production values are parsed into typed and frozen environment data (1.696067ms)
✔ runtime parsing rejects placeholders without exposing their values (1.361383ms)
✔ production validation rejects insecure transport, proxy, cache, logging, and cookie choices (0.594987ms)
✔ cross-field validation rejects unsafe TTL and upload directory relationships (1.409475ms)
✔ cross-field validation keeps route limits within the global request budget (10.160043ms)
✔ database configuration requires UTC and TLS for remote production servers (0.921018ms)
✔ path traversal and unknown template keys are rejected (1.663978ms)
✔ duplicate environment keys fail before parsing (0.332131ms)
✔ file loading rejects file typos while ignoring unrelated process variables (7.208097ms)
✔ unrelated process variables are ignored when strict file mode is not requested (0.740066ms)
✔ environment and nested diagnostic redaction hide all sensitive values (0.497971ms)
✔ health-check CLI parses bounded options and rejects unknown input (1.448404ms)
✔ health-check URL defaults locally and rejects embedded credentials (3.24342ms)
✔ health-check client validates the response contract (2.406017ms)
✔ application lifecycle moves through starting, ready, draining, and stopped (1.154691ms)
✔ application lifecycle rejects impossible transitions (0.342797ms)
✔ graceful shutdown stops HTTP before closing the database and is idempotent (6.231114ms)
✔ shutdown deadline force-closes connections and still closes the pool (13.505892ms)
✔ secret redaction handles nested keys, tokens, URL credentials, bigint, and cycles (3.215217ms)
✔ JSON logger applies thresholds, child bindings, and stderr separation (0.828379ms)
✔ ledger validation rejects unbalanced, duplicate-account, and unsafe amount inputs (1.271917ms)
✔ balanced reward posts atomically and rebuilds the user projection (9.072218ms)
✔ a repeated ledger idempotency key returns the committed result without new entries (4.405902ms)
✔ reusing a ledger idempotency key for different data is rejected (1.242944ms)
✔ a debit cannot make a user available account negative (0.486233ms)
✔ reversal appends opposite entries and restores reward and lifetime projections (1.338337ms)
✔ wallet cursor is signed, round-trips, and rejects tampering (2.65965ms)
✔ wallet history validation bounds limit and rejects unknown query fields (1.792943ms)
✔ wallet returns authoritative integer strings and projection health (0.600145ms)
✔ history preserves available and held deltas and emits a signed next cursor (0.654607ms)
✔ projection comparison identifies exact mismatched fields (0.209405ms)
✔ reconciliation repair locks user accounts before replacing the snapshot (0.577961ms)
✔ Admin-created task always uses the server settlement currency and starts as draft (3.51584ms)
✔ publishing a future timer task uses optimistic versioning and scheduled state (1.084696ms)
✔ unsupported verification integrations and stale Admin versions fail closed (0.838564ms)
✔ an early task claim rolls back without creating a ledger reward (16.680348ms)
✔ verified task claim posts ledger and completion in one transaction (1.722727ms)
✔ manual verification claim becomes pending without issuing a reward (0.650361ms)
✔ claim idempotency replay returns the committed completion before task mutation (1.161631ms)
✔ task validation accepts only server-governed task fields and integer minor units (10.364966ms)
✔ eligibility rules fail closed when stored configuration is malformed (0.929561ms)
✔ eligibility evaluates username, geography, progress, and account age server-side (1.309544ms)
✔ completion policy enforces active, global, one-time, daily, and cooldown limits (0.256166ms)
✔ task configuration uses deployment URL policy and rejects unavailable callbacks (0.568848ms)
✔ start and claim idempotency hashes are scoped and compared safely (0.768539ms)
✔ completion period keys make one-time, daily, and repeatable awards deterministic (0.257078ms)
✔ scheduled task activates safely and snapshots all reward-critical fields on start (15.948174ms)
✔ an existing active attempt blocks a second start before any insert (1.075401ms)
✔ start idempotency replay returns the immutable destination snapshot (1.087019ms)
✔ referral policy uses safe defaults for invalid database settings (1.04108ms)
✔ referral activation waits for the server-counted task threshold (1.272869ms)
✔ eligible referral activation posts both server-controlled rewards atomically (1.420642ms)
✔ shared-device risk holds a referral and never posts a reward (0.326502ms)
✔ account restriction is evaluated before age and task progress (0.162084ms)
✔ Admin referral setting update versions history and commits optimistic write (2.083501ms)
✔ stale Admin referral setting version rolls back without writing (0.620365ms)
✔ Admin approval records review then re-runs activation in the same transaction (1.191056ms)
✔ Admin-created boxes persist only server-enforced free access fields (1.686663ms)
✔ stale Admin box updates roll back before a database mutation (0.772655ms)
✔ publish validates the reward pool and performs one optimistic transition (0.686755ms)
✔ reward inventory cannot be reduced below its immutable awarded count (0.395556ms)
✔ daily eligibility uses server task count and timezone period boundaries (13.893577ms)
✔ task requirements are evaluated from authoritative integer counts (0.149275ms)
✔ cooldown eligibility is anchored to the last committed claim (0.302106ms)
✔ weighted selection uses an injected cryptographic ticket boundary (0.286752ms)
✔ exhausted rewards are excluded and fixed mode requires exactly one reward (0.788598ms)
✔ publishing enforces free-only configuration and a valid reward pool (0.764783ms)
✔ Admin payloads cannot introduce payment fields or unsafe money numbers (3.160425ms)
✔ eligible free claim reserves inventory, posts ledger, and stores evidence atomically (15.345706ms)
✔ insufficient verified task progress rolls back before reward or ledger mutation (0.87509ms)
✔ a committed idempotency key returns the original claim without a new transaction (0.447635ms)
✔ earning-restricted users cannot reserve inventory or receive a reward (5.560833ms)
✔ reject atomically refunds the full held gross amount, never only the net amount (3.764265ms)
✔ the first high-value approval remains under review and does not move money (0.303367ms)
✔ the required final approval transitions to approved with immutable approval evidence (0.516709ms)
✔ manual paid confirmation settles held gross into exact net payout and fee credits (0.848329ms)
✔ decrypted destination details are released only after stored hash verification (0.790732ms)
✔ payout confirmation rejects stale versions and non-approved states before settlement (1.043113ms)
✔ global and method rules combine using the stricter financial limits (1.569787ms)
✔ percentage fees round upward and all amounts stay decimal strings (0.580866ms)
✔ eligibility is derived from server account, task, referral, wallet, day, and cooldown state (0.932226ms)
✔ restricted and too-new accounts fail closed (0.181123ms)
✔ dynamic destination fields reject unknown values and produce a safe display mask (0.966427ms)
✔ dual approval is required only at or above the configured high-value threshold (0.158879ms)
✔ withdrawal payload schemas reject client-controlled totals and unsafe numeric amounts (4.66938ms)
✔ Admin method and setting schemas enforce consistent fees and optimistic versions (4.636009ms)
✔ invalid stored setting values fall back to conservative defaults (0.329237ms)
✔ quote derives fee and expiry on the server without posting ledger entries (15.495772ms)
✔ request atomically encrypts details, holds the gross amount, consumes quote, and records history (3.201267ms)
✔ a concurrent quote-consumption conflict rolls back the complete request transaction (1.44595ms)
✔ idempotent request replays must match the original canonical input fingerprint (0.58337ms)
✔ managed setting policy preserves the free-only Mystery Box boundary (0.909722ms)
✔ managed setting policy bounds pagination and normalizes allowlisted URLs (0.176496ms)
✔ theme payload accepts the closed token contract and rejects CSS injection (3.041676ms)
✔ feature flag mutation permits rollout only and rejects targeting objects (0.937905ms)
✔ currency input canonicalizes ISO-style codes and caps decimal precision (1.095322ms)
✔ maintenance windows require strictly ordered timestamps (1.003714ms)
✔ setting updates write an immutable next-version record in one transaction (1.707114ms)
✔ setting updates reject null when it violates the stored value type (0.73658ms)
✔ settlement currency precision cannot change after ledger setup (0.447144ms)
✔ publishing a theme retires the former active theme inside the transaction (0.632684ms)
✔ plain content is encoded into inert server-generated HTML (1.209694ms)
✔ banner validation requires verified-media identity and paired actions (2.327129ms)
✔ announcement targeting schema is strict and date ordered (1.781726ms)
✔ tutorial validation rejects client lifecycle and malformed slugs (0.845715ms)
✔ announcement targeting fails closed for missing or mismatched user attributes (0.193702ms)
✔ disabled banner feature avoids every content database read (0.820347ms)
✔ banner creation rejects media that is not verified and public (0.927718ms)
✔ future announcement publishing selects scheduled state on the server clock (1.312498ms)
✔ tutorial creation rejects a URL outside the deployment allowlist (0.806266ms)
✔ media resolution blocks storage paths that escape the public root (0.433483ms)
✔ Telegram templates preserve allowlisted markup and escape every variable (1.591689ms)
✔ Template buttons are HTTPS-only and expose one closed Telegram keyboard shape (0.714577ms)
✔ Internal Telegram payload contract rejects arbitrary methods, chats, and oversized text (2.665529ms)
✔ Outbox claims use leases and exponential retry is bounded and honors Telegram retry-after (0.76959ms)
✔ Outbox worker completes successes and records failures without logging payloads (0.475226ms)
✔ Telegram job rejects malformed success responses instead of recording a false delivery (0.394755ms)
✔ Reminder next-run calculation follows IANA local time and ISO weekdays (39.055562ms)
✔ Broadcast creator cannot approve their own draft (0.652003ms)
✔ Transactional amount placeholders format integer minor units without floating point (0.226811ms)
✔ analytics periods use closed UTC dates and ISO calendar boundaries (2.032204ms)
✔ earning-history cursors are scoped, signed, and reject tampering (1.257186ms)
✔ earning history emits only signed server ledger deltas and an opaque next cursor (0.572112ms)
✔ earning summary keeps integer minor units and reports reversals separately (0.47064ms)
✔ public leaderboard uses snapshots and never requests Telegram identifiers (0.496449ms)
✔ rollup is idempotent per closed date and builds every allowlisted snapshot (1.049002ms)
✔ Admin financial reports keep monetary values behind a separate service method (0.585052ms)
✔ profile contract accepts explicit leaderboard privacy without accepting identity fields (1.709697ms)
✔ miniapp money formatting preserves every BIGINT minor unit including negative fractions (15.897968ms)
✔ miniapp amount entry never uses floating point or accepts exponent notation (0.243858ms)
✔ miniapp navigation normalizes hashes and rejects malformed or traversal routes (0.98166ms)
✔ miniapp rejects credential-bearing and executable URLs (0.167092ms)
✔ withdrawal field validation mirrors allowed format and option contracts (1.071766ms)
✔ miniapp API rejects non-local paths before sending credentials (0.759265ms)
✔ miniapp shares CSRF retrieval and coalesces concurrent identical mutations (3.870405ms)
✔ failed CSRF requests can be retried and do not send a mutation (1.553743ms)
✔ uncertain financial mutations reuse the same key on deliberate retry (1.448614ms)
✔ API failures retain safe request references and distinguish timeout (1.702767ms)
✔ authentication never invents a development identity outside Telegram (0.642248ms)
✔ theme tokens reject CSS injection and reset stale per-theme overrides (1.171176ms)
✔ admin client rejects external and traversal destinations before sending credentials (1.98994ms)
✔ admin mutations coalesce and use the admin CSRF token without persisting credentials (3.505295ms)
✔ failed mutations are never automatically retried and preserve error context (0.586134ms)
✔ session invalidation discards late responses and does not send an awaiting mutation (0.525352ms)
✔ 401 invalidates authentication while 403 keeps an actionable permission error (0.872716ms)
✔ catalog hides ungranted resources and exact withdrawal decision controls (0.376978ms)
✔ minor units remain decimal strings and numeric configuration rejects unsafe integers (0.325411ms)
✔ forms preserve optional omission, explicit null, booleans and nested reward values (132.181403ms)
✔ create task form submits only supported server fields and keeps rewards precise (31.598628ms)
✔ editing plain content round-trips server HTML without double encoding (11.488838ms)
✔ reminder form reconstructs template keys and keeps nested audience rules (9.938719ms)
✔ template editor sends all strict fields and represents nullable button config (9.329955ms)
✔ settings editor fixes free-only protection and preserves server versions (12.213778ms)
✔ resource query only includes route-supported fields and identities are encoded (0.351653ms)
✔ login completes password challenge and TOTP without persisting a password (20.439588ms)
✔ withdrawal confirmation requires review and duplicate clicks share one request (16.084305ms)
✔ conflict keeps the draft visible and prevents immediate resubmission (23.324994ms)
✔ resource UI renders hostile text inert and ignores a disposed response (13.617315ms)
✔ dashboard renders daily chart and table from real response values and isolates financial reports (12.834358ms)
✔ search phrases with spaces and encoded URL punctuation stay on the local admin endpoint (0.568702ms)
✔ admin entry restores an authenticated shell and logout clears its private data (15.871873ms)
✔ administrator form loads named roles, reviews the request and displays a one-time invitation safely (107.780275ms)
✔ wallet correction editor creates a stable hidden idempotency key per draft (10.951ms)
✔ resolved fraud records offer no further review action (26.628176ms)
✔ enrollment accepts own password then verifies TOTP without retaining invitation or password fields (17.820835ms)
✔ closing enrollment while a response is pending cannot restore its secret (34.643113ms)
✔ enrollment API obtains anonymous admin CSRF and never exempts its mutations (1.33216ms)
✔ mobile authenticator app switching hides the setup key but permits returning with a code (14.789263ms)
✔ retry risk acknowledgement requires a deliberate checked choice (12.62769ms)
✔ administrative changes recheck active session and fresh permission before writing (3.848823ms)
✔ identity management cannot be delegated by assigning only a manage permission (0.964304ms)
✔ invitation stores only a token digest and does not provision active credentials (4.386553ms)
✔ self access changes and stale administrator versions cannot revoke the last operator (1.055301ms)
✔ administrator role/status change and session revocation commit together (2.060076ms)
✔ a cancelled, unenrolled administrator cannot be enabled through access editing (2.397955ms)
✔ built-in roles cannot be edited, while custom grants revoke assigned sessions (1.142373ms)
✔ account ban revokes sessions without leaving a permanent banned status after expiry (1.234061ms)
✔ unban removes only the selected scope and requires its separate permission (0.879846ms)
✔ competing fraud decisions have one winner and persist the review reason (1.111315ms)
✔ wallet correction preparation is idempotent and cannot change money (1.171566ms)
✔ wallet adjustment rejects self approval and posts exactly once under competing reviews (7.379356ms)
✔ insufficient debit rolls back review and ledger; rejection never changes money (0.595868ms)
✔ money and control inputs reject floats, forged actor fields and missing risk acknowledgement (5.481194ms)
✔ manual retry refuses sent, cancelled, unlinked, stale and permanent recipient failures (0.418971ms)
✔ manual retry retains attempt number/payload and only schedules one additional attempt (1.212918ms)
✔ retry rechecks delivery consent and cannot revive an ineligible campaign (0.229435ms)
✔ invitation enrollment consumes both tokens, encrypts TOTP, and returns recovery codes only once (6.850948ms)
✔ failed enrollment attempts commit their counter and stop verification after five codes (2.688414ms)
✔ outbox terminal failure records its linked job in the same executor and never writes for a lost lease (0.610991ms)
✔ administrative repositories bind arbitrary text and refuse arbitrary table names (0.359371ms)
✔ fraud evidence reveal redacts nested credentials and sensitive identity evidence (0.671613ms)
✔ release schema check is read-only and verifies the complete release (17.663901ms)
✔ release refuses missing schema history (20.622752ms)
✔ release refuses changed schema history (16.978597ms)
✔ release refuses missingSeed schema history (13.489708ms)
✔ release refuses partial schema history (9.282425ms)
✔ Redis fails immediately while offline and bounds queued commands (0.317429ms)
✔ production rejects unsafe DATABASE_QUEUE_LIMIT=0 (8.330399ms)
✔ production rejects unsafe REDIS_URL=redis://default:valid-pass@remote.internal:6379 (1.238347ms)
✔ production rejects unsafe REDIS_URL=redis://127.0.0.1:6379 (1.948087ms)
✔ live acceptance cannot select a production database or an unconfirmed target (0.504531ms)
✔ backup roundtrip preserves binary bytes and private output permissions (22.378439ms)
✔ backup rejects wrong-key and removes unauthenticated plaintext (12.214165ms)
✔ backup rejects ciphertext and removes unauthenticated plaintext (6.873593ms)
✔ backup rejects tag and removes unauthenticated plaintext (5.22696ms)
✔ backup rejects header and removes unauthenticated plaintext (2.695014ms)
✔ backup rejects truncated and removes unauthenticated plaintext (3.03115ms)
✔ backup rejects size-limit and removes unauthenticated plaintext (7.858979ms)
✔ backup and restore never overwrite an existing output (3.380467ms)
✔ backup key rejects malformed, ambiguous or short key material (0.362626ms)
✔ completed polling intervals release abort listeners over repeated cycles (28.213626ms)
✔ readiness times out even when the database connection queue never resolves (16.428563ms)
✔ database backup CLI publishes only a successful dump (failure=false) (82.115778ms)
✔ database backup CLI publishes only a successful dump (failure=true) (70.010742ms)
✔ admin user list schema caps page sizes and rejects deleted pseudo-filter (3.021816ms)
✔ admin user mappings preserve large numeric values as strings (0.876692ms)
✔ admin user list uses normalized pagination and parallel repository reads (0.524921ms)
✔ admin user detail combines profile, restrictions, wallets, and metrics (0.476589ms)
✔ cache returns a valid hit without invoking the loader (1.352249ms)
✔ cache fails open on malformed reads and write failures (0.340394ms)
✔ cache does not persist oversized responses (0.584071ms)
✔ local day and week boundaries are converted to UTC for Dhaka (13.96949ms)
✔ day boundaries respect daylight-saving transitions (0.560805ms)
✔ database and offset datetimes normalize to the same UTC representation (0.47058ms)
✔ theme tokens accept a closed safe schema and reject CSS injection (0.601917ms)
✔ setting guards accept only usable locale lists and IANA timezones (12.593457ms)
✔ bootstrap combines safe public configuration with user-scoped state (0.923993ms)
✔ dashboard returns decimal-safe strings and never exposes task destination URLs (2.676986ms)
✔ feature gates prevent disabled task and free-reward database reads (0.953277ms)
✔ database numeric guards reject unsafe representations (0.378691ms)
✔ free reward eligibility is display-only and honors frequency boundaries (0.204708ms)
✔ profile schema rejects Telegram-owned and financial fields (2.734502ms)
✔ profile reads expose Telegram IDs as strings and only public fields (2.156702ms)
✔ profile update validates flags/settings before opening a transaction (12.811946ms)
✔ disabled profile editing fails before a database transaction begins (0.621878ms)
✔ unsupported language and invalid timezone are rejected server-side (0.400354ms)
✔ memory rate-limit store increments and resets fixed windows (1.223725ms)
✔ Redis rate-limit store uses one atomic script and namespaced keys (0.442066ms)
✔ Redis client factory applies TLS verification and bounded reconnects (0.250518ms)
✔ Redis connection, readiness cache, and close lifecycle are bounded (0.454405ms)
✔ database readiness is cached and concurrent checks share one query (1.022732ms)
✔ database readiness fails closed without throwing dependency details (1.252689ms)
✔ migration runner applies each immutable migration once under a schema lock (2.565959ms)
✔ migration runner resumes after a partial DDL failure without replaying recorded statements (1.018045ms)
✔ migration runner rejects a changed file after it has been applied (0.818254ms)
✔ seeds require all migrations, run once, and rollback invalidates seed history (2.473289ms)
✔ validation middleware stores only schema-approved data and returns safe issues (6.745881ms)
✔ maintenance and ban gates use trusted server-side providers (0.642969ms)
✔ idempotency middleware hashes accepted keys and rejects duplicates (1.142563ms)
✔ audit middleware records completed mutations without delaying responses (8.238761ms)
✔ HMAC signatures are deterministic and reject modified input (1.226839ms)
✔ CSRF tokens are signed, session-bound, and time-limited (0.575097ms)
✔ secure random and idempotency helpers enforce bounded keys (0.349437ms)
✔ managed URL allowlist requires approved schemes, domains, and credential-free URLs (0.349557ms)
✔ HTML and plain-text helpers encode markup and remove unsafe controls (0.321455ms)
✔ SQL splitter preserves quoted semicolons and removes comments (0.830602ms)
✔ migration parser requires both sections and rejects session control (0.891905ms)
✔ seed parser accepts one section and checksum is deterministic (0.49101ms)
✔ all migration and seed files load in contiguous order (41.665757ms)
✔ Telegram exchange creates one user, first-touch referral, and opaque session atomically (2.439588ms)
✔ existing Telegram users retain their internal database ID during profile sync (0.333413ms)
✔ simultaneous first login recovers from a unique-user insert race (0.674016ms)
✔ Telegram API client sends JSON webhook settings and exposes no token on failure (2.19581ms)
✔ bot command routing is private-chat only and preserves a bounded referral payload (0.416768ms)
✔ Mini App keyboards require HTTPS and Telegram HTML is escaped (0.268695ms)
✔ webhook service acknowledges duplicates and retries failed processing safely (0.27844ms)
✔ failed webhook retries cannot replace the payload for an existing update ID (0.717442ms)
✔ Telegram initData validates HMAC, freshness, and bigint-safe identity strings (4.353674ms)
✔ Telegram initData rejects tampering, expiry, future dates, and duplicate protected fields (2.601232ms)
✔ Telegram initData rejects bot users and unsafe numeric identities (1.415674ms)
✔ user sessions store only a hash and emit an HttpOnly secure cookie (1.741166ms)
✔ cookie and IP parsing fail safely on malformed values (3.54857ms)
✔ session authentication maps public identity and rolls idle expiry server-side (0.462657ms)
✔ public IDs are 26-character sortable Crockford identifiers (0.376478ms)
ℹ tests 437
ℹ suites 0
ℹ pass 437
ℹ fail 0
ℹ cancelled 0
ℹ skipped 0
ℹ todo 0
ℹ duration_ms 3329.297979

[phase-20-check] Running verify:environment:example
npm warn Unknown env config "http-proxy". This will stop working in the next major version of npm.

> telegram-task-earning@0.20.0 verify:environment:example
> node bin/verify-environment.js --example

Telegram Task Earning — Phase 20 environment verification
Mode: example-template
Source: .env.example (found)
Node.js: v24.19.0 (supported)
Keys: 87/87 recognized
Placeholders: 13
Environment verification passed.

[phase-20-check] Running verify:database-schema
npm warn Unknown env config "http-proxy". This will stop working in the next major version of npm.

> telegram-task-earning@0.20.0 verify:database-schema
> node scripts/verify-database-schema.js

Database schema verified: 23 migrations, 6 seeds, 77 tables, 259 named constraints, 202 up statements, 178 down statements, 19 seed statements.

[phase-20-check] Running build:css
npm warn Unknown env config "http-proxy". This will stop working in the next major version of npm.

> telegram-task-earning@0.20.0 build:css
> node scripts/build-css.js

npm warn Unknown env config "http-proxy". This will stop working in the next major version of npm.

> telegram-task-earning@0.20.0 build:css:miniapp
> postcss resources/css/miniapp.css --output public/miniapp/css/app.min.css --env production

npm warn Unknown env config "http-proxy". This will stop working in the next major version of npm.

> telegram-task-earning@0.20.0 build:css:admin
> postcss resources/css/admin.css --output public/admin/css/admin.min.css --env production

CSS bundles built successfully.

[phase-20-check] Running verify:project
npm warn Unknown env config "http-proxy". This will stop working in the next major version of npm.

> telegram-task-earning@0.20.0 verify:project
> node scripts/verify-project.js

Phase 19 project verification passed: 81 directories, 510 required files, and 38 npm scripts.

Phase 20 quality gate passed.